Odds of Dying
The Odds of Dying in the U.S.
What are the odds of dying in a given year as a result of being bitten
by a poisonous snake in the U.S.? How about exposure to radiation? What
are the odds that you'll die as a result of medical or surgical
complications in your lifetime?
These are exactly the kinds of questions that the statisticians of
the U.S. National Safety Council have considered, and for which they
have posted the odds that someone in the U.S. will die of either in a
single year, or during their lifetime, based upon the number of recorded
occurrences of each non-natural cause of death in 2004.
We've taken a handful of that data and presented it in a dynamic
table below, which you can sort according to the various column
headings. We'll have some interesting observations below the table
The Odds of Dying in the U.S.
|National Safety Council Odds of Dying in the
|Type of Accident or Manner of Injury
||Deaths in 2004
||Odds of Death in Any Given Year
||Odds of Death in Lifetime
|All - All External Causes of Mortality
||00,001,756 to 1
||000,023 to 1
|Assault - All
||00,016,919 to 1
||000,217 to 1
|Assault - Firearm
||00,025,263 to 1
||000,324 to 1
|Intentional Self Harm
||00,009,053 to 1
||000,116 to 1
|Legal Intervention - All
||00,789,400 to 1
||010,134 to 1
|Legal Intervention - Execution
||05,647,247 to 1
||072,494 to 1
|Legal Intervention - Involving Firearm
||00,944,324 to 1
||012,121 to 1
|Medical and Surgical Care Complications
||00,101,858 to 1
||001,308 to 1
|Operations of War - All
||10,487,744 to 1
||134,631 to 1
|Transport Accidents - All
||00,006,197 to 1
||000,080 to 1
|Transport Accidents - Motor Vehicle
||00,006,535 to 1
||000,084 to 1
|Unintentional - Alcohol Poisoning
||00,820,271 to 1
||010,530 to 1
|Unintentional - All
||00,004,591 to 1
||000,059 to 1
|Unintentional - Bitten or Struck by a Dog
||10,876,179 to 1
||139,617 to 1
|Unintentional - Bitten or Struck by Other
||03,813,725 to 1
||048,957 to 1
|Unintentional - Cataclysmic Storm
||04,661,220 to 1
||059,836 to 1
|Unintentional - Contact with Hornets, Wasps
||05,647,247 to 1
||072,494 to 1
|Unintentional - Contact with Venomous Snakes
||48,942,807 to 1
||628,277 to 1
|Unintentional - Exposure - All Forces of
||00,266,476 to 1
||003,421 to 1
|Unintentional - Exposure - Earthquake
||09,788,561 to 1
||125,655 to 1
|Unintentional - Exposure - Excessive Natural
||00,434,404 to 1
||005,576 to 1
|Unintentional - Exposure - Excessive Natural
||01,299,367 to 1
||016,680 to 1
|Unintentional - Exposure to Electric
||03,124,009 to 1
||040,103 to 1
|Unintentional - Exposure to Radiation
|Unintentional - Firearms Discharge
||00,452,476 to 1
||005,808 to 1
|Unintentional - Flood
||13,348,038 to 1
||171,348 to 1
We found it pretty interesting that Americans are more likely to die
in an earthquake than they are in operations of war, or for that matter,
just about any force of nature, which suggests that a lot of
Gaia-worshipping, anti-war protesters really might need to rethink their
worldview. We'll also note that global warming may not be a such a bad
thing, seeing as three times as many people die from exposure to
excessive natural cold than die from exposure to excessive natural heat.
At least, it's not a bad thing if you really care about people.
The Odds of Dying in the U.S.
The odds of dying
The National Safety Council has been compiling and reporting on injury
data every year since the 1920s. The table below was prepared in
response to frequent inquiries to the Council concerning the odds of
dying from or being killed by a specific incident or occurrence such as
a lightning strike or a plane crash.
The odds given below are statistical averages over the whole U.S.
population and do not necessarily reflect the chances of death for a
particular person from a particular external cause. Any individual's
odds of dying from various external causes are affected by the
activities in which they participate, where they live and drive, what
kind of work they do, and other factors.
The table has four columns. The first column gives the manner of injury
such as motor-vehicle crash, fall, fire, etc. The second column gives
the total number of deaths nationwide due to the manner of injury in
2004 (the latest year for which data are available). The third column
gives the odds of dying in one year due to the manner of injury. The
fourth column gives the lifetime odds of dying from the manner of
Statements about the odds or chances of dying from a given cause of
death may be made as follows:
* The odds of dying from (manner of injury) in 2004 were 1 in (value
given in the one-year odds column).
* The life-time odds of dying from (manner of injury) for a person born
in 2004 were 1 in (value given in the lifetime odds column).
* The odds of dying from an injury in 2004 were 1 in 1,756.
* The lifetime odds of dying from an injury for a person born in 2004
were 1 in 23.
Source: National Safety Council estimates based on data from National
Center for Health Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau. Deaths are
classified on the basis of the Tenth Revision of the World Health
Organization's "The International Classification of Diseases" (ICD).
Numbers following titles refer to External Cause of Morbidity and
Mortality classifications in ICD-10. One year odds are approximated by
dividing the 2004 population (293,656,842) by the number of deaths.
Lifetime odds are approximated by dividing the one-year odds by the life
expectancy of a person born in 2004 (77.9 years).
Odds of Death Due to Injury, United States,
When major catastrophes strike, like the recent Asian earthquake and
tsunami, the mass deaths can lead one to think that natural disasters
are the most likely way people can die.
Not by a long shot.
According to the National Center for Health Statistics, the leading
causes of death in the United States are, in this order, heart disease,
cancer, stroke, chronic lower respiratory diseases, and "accidental
injury," a broad category that includes a lot of stuff that just
You are more likely to commit suicide or fall to your death than be
killed by a tsunami or any natural disaster, the odds say.
A new report finds that cancer became the leading killer of
Americans under 85, based on 2002 data. That report is not
reflected in this article.
In less advanced countries, where residents often live in poverty and
huddle near the sea or in poorly constructed houses, tsunamis, floods
and earthquakes are a more looming threat. But even in such locales,
there are far greater risks over the course of a lifetime.
There are no formal estimates on the risk of death by tsunami,
because they occur so infrequently.
About 2,200 died in a Papua New Guinea tsunami in 1998; roughly 8,000
in the Philippines in 1976, about 120 in Hawaii and California in 1964.
You have to go back to 1896 -- 27,000 deaths in Japan -- to find one
that even approached the 150,000-plus scale of the Asian disaster on
Dec. 26, 2004.
Michael Paine, of the Planetary Society Australian Volunteers,
monitors and calculates risks of low-frequency events like asteroid
impacts and tsunamis. He estimates the odds of a tsunami being the
average coastal dweller's cause of death, globally speaking, are around
1-in-50,000. For the average citizen in the United States, given that
many don't live near the coast, the chances are 1-in-500,000 or even
perhaps less likely. Paine stressed this is a very rough estimate.
The real odds drop to zero, of course, if you live in the mountains
and never visit the shore.
In fact, that sort of risk management -- intentional or not -- goes
for many things. Frequent flyers are more likely to die in a plane crash
than someone who never flies. A Californian is at greater risk from
earthquakes than someone in Minnesota.
Overall, global deaths from sudden natural disasters -- things Nature
dishes out over moments, hours or days -- have been on the decline in
recent years, with the exception of 2003 and 2004. Officials credit
better warnings and swifter response to help victims.
In 2003, the last year for which worldwide deaths have been tabulated
by the Red Cross, natural disasters killed 76,000 people. The figure was
skewed by two events: a heat wave in Europe that overcame more than
22,000 and an earthquake in Iran that killed upwards of 30,000.
(Earthquakes kill roughly 10,000 people every year, on average.)
The bigger threats
The previous ten years saw an average of 62,000 global deaths per
year from natural disasters. That's far less than the tolls taken by
famine, disease and war.
Communicable diseases kill millions of people every year (13.3
million 1998, according to the World Health Organization).
In sub-Saharan Africa last year, AIDS killed about two million
people, according to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal. Even
more died because of bad water or sanitation systems. In Kenya, AIDS
deaths are "equivalent to two 747 jets crashing every day," stated a
recent Red Cross report.
Another study estimated that 3.3 million people died due to war in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1998 to 2002. More than
three-quarters of the deaths owed to diseases and malnutrition resulting
from the fighting.
Globally, violence is a leading killer. It accounts for 14 percent of
all deaths among males and 7 percent among females, according to a 2003
analysis by the World Heath Organization. On an average day, 1,424
people are murdered. Somebody commits suicide every 40 seconds.
Changing risk factors
Perceptions of risk factors can change over time simply because more
is learned. The chances of an Earth-impacting asteroid killing you have
dropped dramatically, for example, from about 1-in-20,000 in 1994 to
something like 1-in-200,000 or 1-in-500,000 today.
The new numbers -- their range reflecting the need for further
research -- were offered up last week by Clark Chapman of the Southwest
Research Institute and David Morrison at NASA's Ames Research Center.
Why such a dramatic downgrade? Active intervention.
"A significant part of it is that we have now discovered, in the last
dozen years, a good fraction of the largest, most deadly asteroids and
found that they won't hit the Earth," Chapman told LiveScience.
Also, projections of the destruction a large space rock would cause
have been revised downward a bit. Finally, since Earth is two-thirds
water, asteroid risks include the possibility of an impact-induced
tsunami. And Chapman says asteroid-generated tsunamis may not be as
deadly as once presumed.
Others contend the odds of death-by-asteroid are still about
1-in-50,000, until the remaining handful of expected large asteroids are
found and determined not to be a near-term threat.
"This is a matter of hot, ongoing debate and calculations, however,
partly motivated by the recent Indian Ocean tsunami," Chapman said.
Which brings up another huge margin of error. The death toll in Asia
was greatly increased by the lack of a tsunami warning system, whereas
there is one covering the Pacific Ocean.
"Our risk exposure from impact tsunamis depends heavily on the
existence of such warning systems," Morrison said.
Both scientists stress that the asteroid risk is just an estimate.
Like everything in this article. In the end, the only stat you can
really count on is the overwhelming likelihood that you will, in fact,
By the numbers
There are significant caveats to consider before you contemplate the
Risk varies with age. Infants face different threats than teens,
whose risks are wildly different from senior citizens. Among people age
one through 44, injuries are by far the leading cause of death in the
United States. But heart disease is the hands-down No. 1 killer for
those over 65. Since average life expectancy is about 77 years in the
United States, simple logic reveals the leading killer of Americans.
The numbers get murkier the closer you look. Statistics are typically
given for a person born in the year the numbers are crunched, but by the
time that person grows up, the outlook will have changed because of
medical advances, diet shifts, changes to the environment, and so on.
The list below is not complete. Rather it includes life-ending
scenarios that carry some of the highest odds for U.S. residents, along
with the chances of checking out in more bizarre fashion.
Health-related statistics and categories with high-odds (like heart
disease at 1-in-5) are among the most statistically significant, sort
of. All odds fluctuate from year-to-year. Toss in a flu pandemic -- some
50 million died in 1918 -- and all bets are off. The World Health
Organization recently warned that the next such bout could kill 7
million people "in a best case scenario." That's not in the odds below.
The more specific figures are based on 2001, the most recent year for
which complete data are available. Other odds, indicated with an
asterisk (*) are based on long-term data.
All figures below are for U.S. residents.
|Cause of Death
|Motor Vehicle Accident*
|Assault by Firearm
|Fire or Smoke
|Natural Forces (heat,
cold, storms, quakes, etc.)
|Air Travel Accident*
|Flood* (included also
in Natural Forces above)
|Tornado* (included also
in Natural Forces above)
(included also in Natural Forces above)
|Snake, Bee or other
Venomous Bite or Sting*
also in Natural Forces above)
** Perhaps 1-in-500,000
Who isn't daydreaming of what we would do with tonight's
$340 million Powerball jackpot?
C'mon, you know you are. Against massive odds, someone eventually will
win the money.
But what are the odds?
A player buying a $1 ticket has a 1 in 146,107,962 chance of matching
the exact six numbers needed to win tonight's $340 million record
jackpot. No one has had all six numbers in the 19 drawings since Aug.
We got to thinking, what are the odds of other
things happening to us? So, we took a look at some of the more commonly
pondered likelihoods and the not-so-common ones, too. The more specific
figures are based on 2001 research, the most recent year for which
complete data is available. All figures below are for U.S. residents.
Odds of being struck by lightning: 1 in 576,000
Odds of dating a supermodel: 1 in 88,000
Odds of an American home having at least one container of ice cream
in the freezer: 9 in 10
Odds of dying from contact with hot tap water: 1 in 5,005,564
Odds of writing a New York Times best seller: 1 in 220
Odds of finding a four-leaf clover on the first try: 1 in 10,000
Odds of being killed by lightning: 1 in 2,320,000
Odds of being murdered: 1 in 18,000
Odds of getting away with murder: 1 in 2
Odds of being attacked by a dog: 1 in 131,890
Odds of dying from a dog bite: 1 in 700,000
Odds of being bitten by a snake, bee or other venomous creature: 1 in
Odds of dying from contact with a venomous animal or plant: 1 in
Odds of dying from any kind of injury during the next year: 1 in
Odds of dying from being bitten or struck by mammals (other than dogs
or humans): 1 in 4,235,477
Odds of dying from a shark attack: 1 in 300,000,000
Odds of having fraternal twins: 3 in 1,000 (for a woman younger than
Odds of having fraternal twins: 14 in 1,000 (for women ages 35-40)
Odds that a person between the age of 18 and 29 does not read a
newspaper regularly: 1 in 3
Odds that an adult does not want to live to age 120 under any
circumstances: 2 in 3
Odds of being considered possessed by Satan: 1 in 7,000
Odds that a first marriage will survive without separation or divorce
for 15 years: 1 in 1.3
Odds that a celebrity marriage will last a lifetime: 1 in 3
Odds of getting hemorrhoids: 1 in 25
Odds of being born a twin in North America: 1 in 90
Odds of being on plane with a drunken pilot: 1 in 117
Odds of being audited by the IRS: 1 in 175
Odds of having your identity stolen: 1 in 200
Odds of dating a millionaire: 1 in 215
Odds of finding out your child is a genius: 1 in 250
Odds of catching a ball at a major league ballgame: 1 in 563
Odds of becoming a pro athlete: 1 in 22,000
Odds of a person in the military winning the Medal of Honor: 1 in
Odds of winning an Academy Award: 1 in 11,500
Odds of striking it rich on Antiques Roadshow: 1 in 60,000
Odds of getting a royal flush in poker on first five cards dealt: 1
Odds of becoming a saint: 1 in 20,000,000
Odds of becoming president: 1 in 10,000,000
Odds of a meteor landing on your house: 1 in 182,138,880,000,000
Odds of dying from intentional self-harm: 1 in 9,380
Odds that Earth will experience a catastrophic collision with an
asteroid in the next 100 years: 1 in 5,560
Odds of dying in such a collision: 1 in 20,000
Odds of experiencing an earthquake: 1 in 100,000
Odds of dying from exposure to forces of nature (heat, cold,
lightning, earthquake, flood): 1 in 225,107
Odds of dying in an airplane accident: 1 in 354,319
Odds of dying from choking on food: 1 in 370,035
Odds of dying in a terrorist attack while visiting a foreign country:
1 in 650,000
Odds of dying in a fireworks accident: 1 in 1,000,000
Odds of dying from overexertion, travel or privation: 1 in 1,428,377
Odds of dying from food poisoning: 1 in 3,000,000
Odds of dying from legal execution: 1 in 3,441,325
Odds of dying from parts falling off an airplane: 1 in 10,000,000
Odds of dying from ignition or melting of nightwear: 1 in 30,589,556
Odds of spotting a UFO today: 1 in 3,000,000
Odds of contracting the human version of mad cow disease: 1 in
Odds of injury from fireworks: 1 in 19,556
Odds of injury from shaving: 1 in 6,585
Odds of injury from using a chain saw: 1 in 4,464
Odds of injury from mowing the lawn: 1 in 3,623
Odds of fatally slipping in bath or shower: 1 in 2,232
Odds of drowning in a bathtub: 1 in 685,000
Odds of being the victim of serious crime in your lifetime: 1 in 20
Odds of dying from a car accident: 1 in 18,585
Odds of dying from any kind of fall: 1 in 20,666
Odds of dying from accidental drowning: 1 in 79,065
Think Again: Homeland Security 2005
For the vast majority of Americans, the chances of dying in a terrorist
attack are close to zero. There’s a higher probability that you’ll die
by falling off a ladder than getting mixed up in some terrorist plot. So
why is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security constantly telling every
American to be afraid? That’s a strategy that creates widespread fear
without making America any safer. U.S. homeland security efforts should
focus less on what is possible and more on what is probable.
“All Americans Should Fear Terrorism”
That’s ridiculous. The odds of dying in a terrorist attack are
minuscule. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, the odds
are about 1 in 88,000. The odds of dying from falling off a ladder are 1
in 10,010. Even in 2001, automobile crashes killed 15 times more
Americans than terrorism. Heart disease, cancer, and strokes are the
leading causes of death in the United States—not terrorism.
People overestimate risks they can picture and ignore those they cannot.
Government warnings and 24–hour news networks make certain dangers, from
shark attacks to terrorism, seem more prevalent than they really are. As
a result, the United States squanders billions of dollars annually
protecting states and locations that face no significant threat of
terrorism. In 2003, Tulsa, Oklahoma, received $725,000 in port security
funds. More than $4 million in 2005 federal antiterror funding will go
to the Northern Mariana Islands. In 2003, Grand Forks County, North
Dakota, received $1.5 million in federal funds to purchase trailers
equipped to respond to nuclear attacks and more biochemical suits than
it has police officers.
These small expenses add up. Federal spending on first responders grew
from $616 million in 2001 to $3.4 billion in 2005, a 500 percent
increase. Homeland security spending will approach $50 billion this
year, not including missile defense—roughly equal to estimates of
China’s defense spending. Yet pundits call for more. A 2003 Council on
Foreign Relations report hyperbolically titled, Emergency Responders:
Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared, recommends increasing
spending on emergency responders to $25 billion per year. To his credit,
the new secretary of homeland security, Michael Chertoff, wants to trim
the pork from the department’s budget. But efforts in congress to link
funding with risk have failed largely because haphazard spending is
consonant with the current U.S. strategy that tells all Americans to be
It’s true that al Qaeda’s attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, may be a harbinger
of a more destructive future. But it is also true that parts of the war
on terrorism are working. Tighter U.S. entry requirements, more
aggressive European policing, the destruction of al Qaeda’s Afghan
sanctuary, and refined intelligence operations have crippled al Qaeda’s
ability to strike the United States. Most of al Qaeda’s original
leadership is dead or in prison. Few other Islamist terrorists—even the
most wanted terrorist in Iraq, Abu Musab al–Zarqawi—are as capable or
organized as al Qaeda once was.
“Terrorists Can Strike Any Place, Any Time, with Any Weapon”
Unlikely. This assertion is the guiding principle of our homeland
security strategy, yet it ignores probability. When the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security dispenses such silly advice as, “Ensure disaster
supply kit is stocked and ready,” or “During a nuclear incident, it is
important to avoid radioactive material, if possible,” it assumes all
Americans face an equal threat and creates widespread fear without
making America safer. The department should focus more on what is
probable and less on what is possible.
Most Americans are safe from terrorist attack. And the most likely forms
of attack remain conventional. The fact is, all terrorist attempts to
use chemical and biological weapons have failed to cause mass
casualties. True, a successful biological weapons attack could kill
hundreds of thousands of people. But manufacturing, controlling, and
successfully dispersing these agents is difficult—probably too difficult
for today’s terrorist groups. Synthesizing and handling chemical agents
such as the deadly nerve agent VX, sarin, or mustard gas is complicated
and extremely dangerous, often requiring access to sophisticated
chemical laboratories. Most experts agree, for instance, that al Qaeda
does not possess the technical capability necessary to produce VX. And
even if terrorists procure and deploy chemical weapons, they are
unlikely to kill many people. The 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo’s subway
system was limited to only 12 deaths. Official U.S. government reports,
including that of the Gilmore Commission, which examines domestic
responses to terrorism, show that it would take one ton of chemical
agent, favorable weather, and considerable time to kill thousands of
people with chemical weapons.
This is to say nothing of the fact that no terrorist organization is
known to possess nuclear weapons. Even for nations with the requisite
monetary resources and scientific infrastructure, building a nuclear
weapon can take decades. Yes, terrorists might try to buy a stolen
nuclear weapon or its parts on the black market. But the chances of
terrorists heisting a working nuclear weapon or assembling one from
stolen parts are low. Most nuclear weapons require delivery vehicles and
activation codes. Stealing all of these elements is next to impossible.
Smaller, more portable tactical nuclear weapons, especially those made
by the former Soviet Union, are a greater danger. Yet, according to a
2002 report by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, most of Russia’s
portable nuclear weapons are probably inoperable today. What about dirty
bombs? They are relatively easy to construct, but much less destructive.
Depending upon variables such as wind direction and the speed of
evacuation, a dirty bomb might not be any more deadly than a
A nuclear terrorist attack in the United States is
possible. That possibility should be enough to produce a more active and
well–funded nonproliferation policy than the United States has today,
especially when it comes to vulnerable stocks of fissile materials
around the world. But that policy should not include preparing all
Americans for nuclear attack.
“Terrorists Will Attack Soft Targets as ï¿½A–List’ Targets Become More
Not necessarily. This claim is made repeatedly in the pages of the 2002
National Strategy for Homeland Security—without any supporting evidence.
A look at past behavior shows that terrorists are likely to continue to
attack well–defended, high–profile targets. Before hitting the World
Trade Center in 2001, al Qaeda targeted the buildings in 1993. After
bombing the U.S.S. Cole in a Yemeni port in 2000, al Qaeda struck a
French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen in 2002. Al Qaeda targeted
airlines in 1995, 1999, and 2001, and it has not stopped since. British
would–be shoe bomber Richard Reid tried to blow up an airplane in
December 2001. In 2002, al Qaeda terrorists fired missiles at planes in
both Saudi Arabia and Kenya. In places such as Singapore and Uzbekistan,
terrorist plots focused on U.S. embassies even after the 1998 embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania encouraged the United States to harden
The idea that terrorists stealthily stalk America for weak spots implies
levels of capability and cohesion that are more myth than reality.
Different terrorist groups have different targets, not to mention
discrepant information about where U.S. vulnerabilities lie. Some groups
may be competent and organized; others are likely not. The assertion
that terrorists continue to case American targets also stems from the
idea that terrorists remain hidden in the United States. But FBI
Director Robert Mueller told Congress in February that there is little
evidence that so–called sleeper cells reside in the United States, even
as he warned the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that he
remains “very concerned about what we are not seeing.”
After years without a terrorist attack, perhaps Americans can take what
they are not seeing seriously. The assumption that terrorists are
flawless and ubiquitous results in unreasoned fear and overreaction.
This ghost is worse than the reality.
“America Is Doing Far too Little to Protect Its Ports”
Hardly. More than $600 billion in goods and nearly 50 percent of U.S.
imports flow through American ports each year. U.S. ports are vulnerable
to both weapons smuggled into the United States in containers and U.S.S.
Cole–style attacks on ships. But there is little indication such attacks
are likely. Since September 11, the United States has made significant
investments in port security. Federal port security grant programs have
distributed about $600 million in funding to hundreds of U.S. ports. The
Coast Guard’s budget has grown to $6.3 billion in the four years since
Sept. 11, 2001. These efforts are enough.
The news media love to mention that U.S. Customs agents inspect only 2
to 5 percent of containers entering the United States. But the measure
of success is which containers are searched, not how many. The key to
protecting ports without unduly burdening commerce is using intelligence
to identify risky cargo. The Container Security Initiative, instituted
by U.S. Customs and Border Protection in 2002, aims to identify and
inspect suspicious cargo before it sails to the United States by
stationing agents in foreign ports, requiring a manifest prior to a
ship’s arrival, determining the origin of containers, and developing
electronic, tamper–proof container seals. This system is far from
perfect. But it is superior to spending vast sums of taxpayer money to
inspect every shipment. And, when one considers the cost to the U.S.
economy of slowing commerce to a snail’s pace, this is one solution that
is worse than the present danger. Any additional port security spending
should respond to known threats, not mere vulnerability.
“Corporations Should Spend More on Security”
False. The odds of any one business in the United States being attacked
by terrorists are vanishingly small. Still, leading terrorism experts
such as Stephen Flynn often tout the fact that 92 percent of America’s
CEOs believe terrorists will not attack their company. This, Flynn and
others argue, is proof that businesses are underinvesting in security
and that government regulation should force them to do more. In fact,
these numbers show that businesses already spend too much.
Osama bin Laden has bragged of his ability to “bankrupt” the United
States. The proper response to tactics such as these is to rationally
evaluate risks while carrying on with business as usual, not to search
frantically for holes to plug. Companies that deal with dangerous
products, such as the chemical industry, or sports franchises that fill
stadiums and create large public crowds, need to take security more
seriously than others. Where the danger to society is high and companies
have incentives to avoid spending more on security, the government may
have to impose security standards or shift liability onto the company.
But these types of situations are rare. Homeland security experts make
much of the vulnerability inherent in modern economies. Manufacturing
and food companies have international supply chains. Commerce relies on
phone lines, power cables, and gas lines. These networks are ubiquitous
and impossible to defend entirely. Because terrorists seek to frighten,
attacks that produce much economic damage but little fear, such as
electricity blackouts or the destruction of livestock, are unlikely.
Companies whose vulnerabilities are exclusively economic have little to
fear from terrorists and should not invest much in the defense against
“Terrorists Will Soon Mount a Crippling Cyberattack”
Nonsense. Cyberattacks are costly and annoying, but they are not a
threat to U.S. national security.
Here, some historical perspective is useful. Alarmists warn that
cyberterrorists could cripple American industry. Yet, even during World
War II, the Allied bombing campaign against Germany failed to halt
industrial production. Modern economies are much more resilient. A 2002
Center for Strategic and International Studies report, for instance,
notes that just because the U.S. national infrastructure uses vulnerable
communications networks does not mean that the infrastructure itself is
vulnerable to attack. The U.S. power grid is run by some 3,000 providers
that rely on diverse information technology systems. Terrorists would
have to attack a large swath of these providers to have a significant
effect. That’s a difficult task. Hackers, unlike summer heat waves and
thunderstorms, have never caused a blackout. The U.S. water system is
similarly robust, as is the U.S. air traffic control system. Although
dams and air traffic control rely on communications networks, hacking
into these networks is not the same as flooding a valley or crashing a
Viruses and denial–of–service attacks are everyday occurrences, but they
are not deadly. Most attacks pass unnoticed. Because terrorists aim to
kill and frighten, they are unlikely to find these sorts of attacks
appealing. Even if they do, they will merely join a crowd of existing
teenagers and malcontents who already make cyberattacks a major business
expense. The annual costs of viruses alone reportedly exceed $10 billion
in the United States. A 2003 Federal Trade Commission report put the
annual cost of identity theft, much of which occurs online, at more than
$50 billion. Cybersecurity gurus have far more to worry about from
traditional hackers than from terrorists.
“Al Qaeda Remains the Largest Threat to U.S. Homeland Security”
Wrong. The organization bin Laden continues to run from Afghanistan or
Pakistan is on the ropes. Today, the main threat to the United States
comes in the form of extremist entrepreneurs with only tenuous links to
bin Laden and from other Sunni terrorist groups. These groups include
Ansar al Islam, Egypt’s Jamaat al–Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad,
Southeast Asia’s Jemaah Islamiah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
Algeria’s Salifist Group for Preaching and War, the Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group, Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad, and a host of others.
The press often blithely refers to these groups as “al Qaeda linked.”
But the links refer to sympathy and personal contacts that date back
years, not continuous communications, planning, or operational control.
These groups can be referred to as a movement, but that does not mean
that they are part of a unified organization. For instance, though
communications between Zarqawi and bin Laden have reportedly been
intercepted, their relationship is a loose alliance, not one that
involves handing down orders or sharing finances.
Most of the large terrorist attacks carried out since September 11 have
had little connection to al Qaeda’s leadership. The recent attacks in
Bali, Turkey, and Spain were independent operations conducted by local
extremists. Consider Madrid. The press still commonly calls the commuter
train bombing there on March 11, 2004, an “al Qaeda attack.” But most
recent evidence indicates that it was carried out by local Muslims,
mostly Moroccans, who had some contacts with the Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group, but little or no connection to bin Laden or Zarqawi.
The Madrid attackers planned and executed their attack without training,
orders, or material assistance from other terrorist groups.
Some experts and policymakers call this collage of al Qaeda fellow
travelers and wannabes a network—and treat it as some form of higher
organization. But the fact that this collection of fundamentalists is
the primary national security threat to the United States should be
cause for celebration. These groups are dangerous, but, thankfully, they
lack the geographic reach and organizational capacity that al Qaeda had